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The future of industrialization in the Gulf 
region 
Prof Robert E. Looney 
THE DEVELOPMENT of a strong and viable industrial structure has long 
been a major economic objective of the Gulf states. For many of these 
countries, industrial development is the key to successful economic diversifi-
cation and the main assurance of continued, self-sustaining growth. Since the 
large increases in oil revenues in the 1970s, Gulf governments have directed 
a substantial portion of their huge development outlays towards the creation 
of an adequate industrial infrastructure and the establishment of certain 
major state-owned heavy industries. The recent turnaround in the world oil 
market and in OPEC's revenue prospects has produced a challenge for Gulf 
industrialization: it is being looked to, earlier than perhaps expected, to justify 
the time, capital and hopes invested in it. 
Advocates and critics alike, studying the process of industrialization in 
the Gulf, have arrived at negative assessments in recent years. For those who 
advocated industrial development as a path towards greater self-reliance and 
reduced dependence on foreign inputs, progress has been slow and often ex-
tremely costly, relative to the gains achieved by many of the South-East 
Asian countries. In addition, Arab industry has been burdened with am-
bitious targets and expectations. 
The purpose of this paper is tO'survey the main industrial developments 
that have occurred in the post-1973/74 period. Based on this, an assessment 
will be made of the likely directions of the Gulf states' industrial develop-
ment in the future. What main structural changes have taken place in indus-
try in the post-1973/74 period? What problems have the Gulf states encoun-
tered in pursuing their industrial diversification efforts? What are the main 
obstacles that must be overcome in the process? What is the likely direction 
industrial development will take in the future? In the discussion that follows, 
attention is focused on the member states of the Gulf Cooperation Council 
- Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab 
Emirates. Because of their relative size, the Islamic Republic oflran and Iraq 
do not share many of the problems related to economic growth in general 
and industrial diversification in particular. 
The author is Professor, National Security Affairs, at the Naval Postgraduate School in 
Monterey, California. 
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Macroeconomic impacts on industrialization 
With the fall in oil revenues in recent years, there has been increasing 
concern that non-renewable resources in the Gulf states may have been 
squandered unnecessarily, and the much prized diversification away from oil 
may be unsustainable without the 'prop' of petrodollars and government 
spending and subsidies. There is also the fear.that the apparent prosperity of 
the oil boom may have masked a number of underlying problems relating to 
industrial efficiency and productivity. 1 
During the 1970s, and in fact ever since the various moves to national-
ize oil production, governments acted as direct producers of goods - with 
varying degrees of efficiency. They were also determined to encourage non-
oil production in the private sector in both manufacturing and agriculture, 
and offered incentives and commitments to purchase the hidden costs which 
are only now being fully recognized. By the end of the inflationary pefiod in 
the Gulf, local governments could, to varying degrees, be criticized as ineffi-
cient direct producers of goods and providers of services, and paymasters of 
an economic diversification effort that implied little risk for the private 
sector promoters. 
During the post-1982 period, government revenues have undergone a 
profound transformation, with oil revenues having to be augmented by other 
local taxes, drawings on financial reserves, domestic and overseas borrowing. 
All these deficit-covering measures are limited in extent, either by their non-
neutral impact on growth and business confidence or by constraints on the 
acceptable level of indebtedness. 
These limits will certainly be tested in the next several years. Gulf 
governments may then be forced to adopt more radical measures. They will 
no longer be able to rely on the slow deflationary-cum-holding exercises that 
have postponed many of the inevitable adjustments in industry. 2 
Problems associated with past expenditure 
The problems of plenty that have troubled countries with an economi-
cally dominant oil or gas sector are referred to in the technical literature as 
the 'Dutch disease'. The principal symptoms of this disease are usually 
found in: the erosion of the existing productive sectors (particularly agricul-
ture and manufacturing) as a result of a general cost increase caused by a 
salary and a wage pull from the oil and government sectors; and a lack of 
competitiveness against imports and in export markets due to the strengthen-
ing of the local exchange rate in response to an oil-generated trade surplus . 
• While it is true that some countries actually had little by way of directly 
productive activity before the discovery of oil, and hence had 'little to be 
damaged', 3 and in spite of the fact that directly productive non-oil assets 
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have expanded alongside the explosion in oil, it is apparent from numerous 
studies that traded goods (primarily manufactures) expanded at rates con-
siderably slower than would have occurred in the absence of the Dutch dis-
ease type incentives for investment in industry. 
It is also clear that much of the observed expansion in directly produc-
tive activity (DPA) has been the result of the heavy subsidization of inputs 
(paid for by oil revenues) and/or the creation of artificial markets for the 
output (i.e. bought by oil revenues). In other words, if the oil revenues 
disappeared, it is questionable that much of the observed expansion in DPA 
could continue for long. 4 
A similar conclusion has been reached from a somewhat different 
approach. This approach seeks to quantify the proportion of oil revenue that 
should be considered 'rent' as opposed to 'income', and therefore in some 
way depreciated in national accounts and transferred into lasting assets. It 
also seeks to establish the 'multiplier effect' on the nominal growth of the 
spending of 'rent' within the local economy. Effectively, any growth in the 
non-oil economy that can be attributable to the demand-generated govern-
ment spending of accrued 'rent' is deemed unsustainable. 5 
The implications of the Dutch disease and rent-generated growth are 
that the diversification programme of the Gulf states may be ultimately 
doomed by the impact oil-based expenditure has had on the domestic price 
system. Unfortunately, the theoretical analysis surrounding the Dutch dis-
ease and related macroeconomic problems provides no real clues as how best 
to limit the damage already caused in the form of bankruptcies, bad debts, 
over-capacity and so on. Nevertheless, some insights as to the future can be 
obtained by examining the main characteristics of Gulf industrialization in 
recent years. 
Characteristics of Gulf industrial development 
It has been over 15 years since the 1973/74 oil boom provided the 
funds and impetus for Gulf industrialization. During that period, several fea-
tures have come to characterize industrial development in the region: 6 
4 1. Industrial development plans have been directed in the main towards 
oil and gas-based industries such as refining, chemical fertilizer and 
petrochemical industries, and/or to energy-intensive industries such 
as aluminium smelters in Bahrain and the UAE, and steel plants in 
Qatar and Saudi Arabia. These industries are primarily aimed at 
export markets. 
2. Apart from oil or energy-related industries, most industrial develop-
ment in the past two decades has been in the field of import 
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substitution, such as construction materials, and processed foods 
which are the most important industries in the region after the petro-
chemical sector. 
3. The industries which exist have been set up for the most part by 
governments and are thus public sector, although some production 
has been undertaken on a mixed sector basis. But it must be noted 
that the involvement of the private sector in industrialization thus 
far has been limited, despite the huge surplus finance held in private 
sector hands, and in spite of the financial and material incentives of-
fered by the governments to attract private sector involvement in 
industry. 
4. With the exception of petrochemicals, fertilizers, steel and 
aluminium, most of the finished products manufactured in the Gulf 
states are consumer goods. The manufacture of industrial goods 
such as tools, machinery and spare parts is negligible to date. 
5. There has been a large import factor in industrial programmes car-
ried out in recent years, because the implementation of industrial 
projects has depended on imported equipment and machinery, as 
well as imported services at the construction stage, such as foreign 
consultants, engineers and contractors, not to mention manufactured 
processes which rely on imported semi-manufactured materials. 
6. Given the limited technical and manpower resources in the region, 
most industrial plants have been installed by multinational com-
panies and operated with foreign labour, either as turnkey operations 
or under production start-up contracts. The results have been high 
installation costs and a built-in dependence on the foreign company 
concerned for the supply of technical expertise, spare parts and 
maintenance. 
7. Given the limitations of the size of the market in any single Gulf 
state, and given the problems of exporting manufactured goods, it is 
rare to find any of the factories in the region operating on ideal 
economic scales of operation at which production is achieved at 
minimum cost. Often Gulf factories have idle capacity with conse-
quent increases in production costs ahd decreases in economic re-
turns on investment. Relevant to this problem is the absence of suf-
ficient levels of protection from foreign competition, since the Gulf 
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states on the whole follow a policy of free trade, allowing private 
sector traders to import competitive products and exposing the 
infant industries of the Gulf to blatantly unequal competition. 
8. In general, there has been a lack of linkages between the industries 
established in the past, with the result that industry as a whole has 
not made a dynamic impact on the development of other sectors 
within the country. The industries have become isolated pockets of 
activity unrelated to any other activities in the country. 
9. Industrial development in the Gulf has been arbitrary rather than an 
element in a concerted programme for socioeconomic progress. As a 
result, there has been no direct connection between development in 
the industrial sector, the agricultural sector and the services se.ctor, 
as there should have been had industrialization taken place within an 
ideal programme. 
10. Industrialization has been carried out without much attention being 
paid to integration and coordination between the various Gulf states 
on the one hand, and with the rest of the Arab world on the other. 
This lack of coordination has had a negative effect in that oppor-
tunities have been missed for diversification or specialization and for 
production on a truly economic scale within wider markets than are 
available to any Gulf state domestically. 
On the basis of this ten-point summary of the nature of the industrializ-
ation which has taken place in the Gulf in the past two decades, it can be said 
that the process was at best peripheral to these states' national economies 
and has had no effect on the prevailing economic structures, despite the rela-
tively large sums invested. Inevitably these characteristics will be reflected in 
the problems encountered in the export of industrial goods from these 
countries. 
Assessment of progress to date 
Since the mid- l 970s, the Gulf region has achieved a relatively high rate 
of growth in industrial production. But, before attempting any detailed assess-
ment of the process of industrial development, it is important to stress sev-
eral basic factors which render any precise, objective analysis of the Gulf in-
dustrialization experience difficult, at the ~resent time: 7 
1. The first factor is the total time-span from the first steps in modern 
industry to the present day, which has been too short to allow the 
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industrial sector to become firmly established as yet; and thus the 
effect of industrial development on economic and social growth in 
the region is hard to quantify. 
2. There are few if any historical analogies that can be made between in-
dustrialization in the Gulf and that in other parts of the world. In con-
trast to previous industrialization efforts, Gulf industrialization has 
depended on external rather than internal factors. 
3. The fact that industrialization has been an external rather than inter-
nal process means that the industries' existence and continued func-
tioning is still dependent on external factors, most of which are out-
side the control of the individual country and therefore somewhat 
difficult to forecast. 
4. There is no real comprehensive strategy for development on the re-
gional level. Thus, while the success of each state in achieving its 
self-declared targets has given the semblance of overall development 
even in terms of industrial growth, the actual growth of industry in 
each economy has not been related to a regional strategy aimed at 
the maximum exploitation of regional resources and markets. 
5. In the absence of a coordinated regional strategy, excessive capacity 
was installed in some sectors of industry, while none was installed in 
others. This imbalance, coupled with the limited size of markets 
available within any single state, meant that there was no possibility 
for the growth of integrated industries so long as development took 
place at the national level rather than in a regional context. 
6. The lack of an integrated regional strategy, each element of which 
would naturally complement a previous stage and initiate a new state 
of development, resulted in a lack of appropriate planning on a pri-
ority basis within the individual state's industrial development 
programme. Too often the decision to install a particular industrial 
plant or process was made on the basis of immediate commercial 
considerations, i.e. short-term profitability. 
7. Not surprisingly, there has been unev~n development in the region, 
with the industrial sector in each country differing greatly in size and 
in its importance to the national economy. 
298 OPEC Review 
8. As a direct result of the structural social changes which took place in 
the period immediately prior to the first industrialization, a more 
sophisticated level of consumerism was appearing in the region. 
With rising consumer demand for a wide range of commodities from 
food to luxury goods, the Gulf states have found themselves becom-
ing more and more dependent on the world economy and on foreign 
commodity imports. The growing consumer tendency was acceler-
ated by government spending policies that were arbitrary, rather 
than the result of careful planning. 
9. Over time, the gap between the consumer-oriented sectors of the 
economy, like commerce and services, and the productive sectors, 
like industry and agriculture, has widened. With oil revenues funding 
the spending spree, the consumer-related elements of the econ9my 
have grown in importance, while the contribution of industry and ag-
riculture to gross domestic product has declined in varying degrees 
from state to state. 
These factors have manifested themselves in several fairly striking 
trends for the countries under examination: 
1. The process of industrial growth in the 1970s resulted in a growth in 
value added by the manufacturing sector, from $528 million in 1970 
to $14,418 min 1982 - a compound growth rate of 32 per cent per 
annum. Intermediate industries played the dominant role in this 
growth, followed by consumer goods and, in last place in terms of 
value added, capital industries. 
2. In spite of these impressive absolute figures, the role of the manu-
facturing sector in generating non-oil GDP remains limited. Crude 
oil continues to dominate all other forms of economic activity, with 
the result that the manufacturing sector contributes no more than 
5-8 per cent to GDP. 
3. As a result of the dependence of the Gulf economies on oil, and the 
rapid growth of consumption patterns unrelated to domestic 
production, the linkage between the region's economies and the 
world economy has grown significantly over time. 
4. More precisely, if we use, as the dependency factor for purposes of 
calculation, total imports plus exports as a percentage of expenditure 
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over GDP, this rose from 85 per cent in 1970 to more than 100 per 
cent in 1982. Ninety per cent of the region's exports are oil, with 
only five per cent manufactured goods. 
The dependence of the Gulf economies as a whole on a single com-
modity is an indicator of the extent of vulnerability; any change in the inter-
national oil market has a direct impact on all ·economic activity and develop-
ment programmes in the region. Moreover, state ownership of the major 
source of revenue has meant that the state sector has borne the responsibility 
for planning and executing development in all sectors, while the role of the 
private sector has been overshadowed, and the use of taxation and fiscal 
policy as a tool of development totally ignored. 
It is clear that the industrialization process in the Gulf states faces many 
obstacles, which stem from the following conditions: 8 
1. The variation between the level of infrastructural development 
achieved and the incentives provided in any given state, compared 
with other states in the region, has created an imbalance, whereby 
some states have become centres for industry at the expense of 
others. The states which have developed an industrial infrastructure 
more quickly have attracted the skilled labour and economic activity 
required, while other areas have been less attractive to skilled labour 
and short of capital. This phenomenon on an inter-state basis is even 
more apparent on a regional basis within a given country. 
2. The industrial development process is heavily dependent on tran-
sient migrant labour. In 1975, the percentage of foreign labour in the 
total economically active population reached 80 per cent in Kuwait, 
while the foreign element was even higher in Qatar and the UAE. 
The failure to produce an indigenous workforce can be attributed to 
several factors, of which the most important are: 
300 
(a) The arbitrary distribution of revenues from production, 
without any direct relationship between income and produc-
tivity of the beneficiaries of the distribution. 
(b) The limitations of educational curricula and the inability of 
the education system to promote the concept and principle 
of productivity, with the result that large segments of the 
population seek to establish an id~tity through conspicuous 
consumption rather than through the creation or accumula-
tion of wealth. 
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(c) Social traditions and legal complications which obstruct the 
participation of women in economic activity, thus further 
reducing the limited availability of manpower. 
(d) The 'cost trap' into which Gulf industries fell in the first 
stages of development and from which they can only escape 
through carefully planned controls and policies. The cost 
trap is a result of weak management. 
Prospects for future revenues 
Many of the problems currently facing the industrial sectors in the Gulf 
states can be traced back to the lack of an overall industrialization strategy -
problems related to the Dutch disease, the bureaucracy and administrative 
routine, the instability of the industrial labour force (almost exclusively 
expatriate), the unbalanced consumer consciousness, the inadequacies of 
incentives at both production and export levels and the insufficient protec-
tion vis-a-vis competition from abroad. 
While each of these factors is important in and of itself, perhaps the key 
factors that will determine the course and nature of the industrialization pro-
cess over the next decade or so will, as in the past, revolve around develop-
ments in oil markets and their resultant budgetary impacts. No assessment of 
future industrial development in the Gulf can be made without first examin-
ing the fiscal environment in which the Gulf governments will design and 
implement their industrial policies. 
Developments in the oil markets 
For the purposes of assessing probable developments in oil markets 
over the next decade or so, the most likely scenario is assumed to be one in 
which oil markets continue the adjustments that began in the early 1980s. 
This scenario assumes that oil markets have not yet completely adjusted to 
worldwide excess capacity in the producing countries, with the net result that 
prices and/or production levels will continue to fall in 1989. 9 
1. In the 1990s, 10 short-run demand can be expected to rise from 
the unsustainable combinations of oil consumption and price that 
characterize the late 1980s. Adjustment will be slow. Nevertheless, 
together with a growing world economy, and low initial prices, the ad-
justment will contribute to strong growth in oil demand from the 
mid- l 990s onward. 
2. As a first approximation, given the low prices in the late 1980s, the 
growth rate in consumption in the 1990s should begin to increase 
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from around two per cent per annum in 1989 to 2.5 per cent by the 
end of the century. 
3. This rate of consumption cannot be sustained throughout the 1990s, 
however, since it would result in levels of demand greater than the 
world capacity to produce oil - little capacity is likely to be added, 
with the low oil prices that will bring about the rapid growth in oil 
consumption. 
4. Clearly, given the demand they are likely to stimulate, 1989 prices 
cannot be sustained throughout the 1990s. Previous studies 11 have 
shown that, as OPEC is pushed to full capacity, oil prices rise. 
5. Nearly all excess capacity to produce oil is in OPEC. Given a w~de 
range of consumption scenarios, OPEC should come close to full 
capacity between late 1992 and early 1993. At or below a price of 
$25/b, OPEC should reach full capacity no later than early 1993. By 
that year, a price of $25/b could prove too low - if world capacity 
does not rise. 
6. Similarly, with world economic growth rates between 2.0 per cent 
and 3.0 per cent, oil prices could reach $30-40/b by the year 2000. 
Of course, these price forecasts are dependent upon a number of 
assumptions. If world capacity to produce oil is decreased, if OPEC restricts 
its production, if oil supplies are disrupted or if economic growth is stronger, 
oil prices will be higher. On the other hand, if world capacity to produce oil is 
increased, if economic growth is weaker or if energy taxation is increased, oil 
prices will be lower than those forecast above. 
The preceding assessment of world oil markets contains both good and 
bad news for the Gulf exporters. Given likely movements in oil prices over 
the next few years, it is unlikely that any of them will be able to maintain the 
level of non-oil income reached in the early 1980s. While these results are 
not necessarily indicative of a 'dismal' future for these countries' citizens, 
they should alert their respective governments that they will be in for a long 
period of sustained internal tension. On the other hand, it appears that, if 
they can survive the next few years, they should be in an excellent position 
to begin a long and sustained expansion of their economies. 
The positive impact of low oil prices in the mid-to-late 1980s and 
higher demand for oil into the 1990s should be most pronounced on the Gulf 
countries. The forecasts presented above imply that, by the mid-1990s, 
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IR Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Mexico, Saudi Arabia and the UAE will account for 
around 85 per cent of world oil exports. Countries like Algeria, Indonesia, 
the Socialist Peoples Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Nigeria, the United Kingdom 
and Venezuela may be by then either merely self-sufficient or net importers 
ofoil. 12 
By the mid-1990s, the world may become once again heavily dependent 
on oil from the Gulf. Revenue from crude oil and the sale of petrochemicals, 
fertilizers and refined oil products will finance high growth prospects in the 
GCC countries, and the 1990s could well see the region experience boom 
conditions reminiscent of the 1970s. 13 
Fiscal options 
Until oil revenues pick up again in the early 1990s, Gulf governments 
will continue coping with their revenue shortfalls as in the recent past - by 
altering the composition of their budgets. They are slowly weaning new in-
dustrial and agriculture ventures away from government dependence. There 
have been several statements from Saudi officials implying that their reluc-
tance to reduce further their financial reserves to cover budget deficits stems 
not only from anxiety about the falling level of these reserves, but also from 
concern that - in the light of the curtailment of government investment pro-
grammes - their reserves would now be quite openly used to meet govern-
ment consumption. 14 
Kuwait, which, of all the Gulf states, has the largest income source inde-
pendent of oil by virtue of previous overseas investments, still prefers not to 
register this income in its budget, as it is treated as officially inalienable until 
the year 2001. To a certain degree, export and increased private sector 
demand for local goods is also helping to reduce dependence on the govern-
ment as purchaser, although government inputs or subsidies are still impor-
tant in ensuring competitiveness. 
Implications for private expenditure 
Private sector demand will still remain largely a function of government 
employment or other expenditure via the 'rent multiplier'. But questions 
about the pace at which this cushion of demand can be removed and the cost 
of removing it have yet to be fully addressed. In the case of Saudi Arabia, 
several quantitative assessments have been made. 15 For two extreme 
scenarios: 
1. If the Saudi Arabian government opted for annual budget deficits in 
• the $25 bn range over the 1986- 92 period, it could expect a positive 
rate of expansion of non-oil GDP of 1.3 per cent, with rising private 
consumption and investment. 
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2. Running a balanced budget over the same period would entail a drop 
in private consumption of 2.1 per cent per year, a fall in private 
sector investment of 5.8 per cent a year, and a reduction in private 
sector output of 4.5 per cent a year. 
One implication of these simulations is that private sector demand is 
likely to remain reasonably buoyant even with low budget deficits and oil 
revenues, because a significant portion of this demand is financed by past 
savings. This seems to confirm the more optimistic observations of certain 
Gulf officials that the fall in oil revenue and government expenditure may 
have set in motion some degree of cure for any Dutch disease that was in 
evidence, i.e. with the easing of the government's pull on the availability of 
manpower, services and goods, and with a greater emphasis on efficiency in 
both the oil and government sectors, the costs of doing business have fallen 
and the returns have become more predictable. 
The willingness of the Gulf private sector to repatriate incremental 
income derived from past government spending or to liquidate foreign cur-
rency deposits in local banks to finance investment in housing or industry or 
even to fund certain government projects, will be critical over the next few 
years. 
Clearly, the private sector needs reassurance that the government will 
not engage in policies likely to restart inflation; it would probably welcome 
the chance to invest in certain government-owned enterprises. The 
government, meanwhile, clearly needs to reduce some of its input costs, by 
charging more for certain services di&turbing the fragile business confidence 
that exists and which it no longer has the funds to prop up artificially. 
In terms of the immediate budgetary problems facing the Gulf states, 
the post-1982 recession had a number of causes: a natural levelling of infra-
structural investment; a forced reduction in government spending; a drop in 
business confidence as a result of intensified regional conflicts. Identification 
of the primary cause is important in assessing the likely timing and nature of 
recovery in the region and who will be responsible for it. 
In the present context, what seems important is that, when the reces-
sion took hold, Gulf governments were forced to rely on the private sector to 
generate genuine demand with or without subsidies, if the governments 
were not to encroach further on their economies. The decline in government 
investment activity might have been softened if the funds had been 
available, but this would have been opposed by administrators who had ac-
quired the experience and confidence to Challenge the contracted mark-ups 
and trumped-up demand scenarios that called for a seemingly endless list of 
ports, airports, electricity and desalination plants. 
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As for the cost of the recession, clearly most of this has been borne 
either directly by the governments or by the banks, with the latter generally 
incurring losses not greater than the windfall profits made in the boom year. 
Governments, on the other hand, have had to step in with 'capital' rescue 
funds, whether directed through 'lifeboat' schemes on the local stock ex-
change or in the banking sector or by drawing on budget reserves. 
Possible revenue strategies 
~ As the option of drawing on budgetary reserves has become less palat-
able because of dwindling resources, a persistently weak oil market, or the 
bias towards current expenditure in the budget, Gulf governments appear to 
have been pursuing fairly similar strategies to improve the situation. 
Strategy in oil 
It would appear clear from recent developments in Saudi Arabia and 
Abu Dhabi that two trends are running concurrently: one to streamline local 
exploration, production, domestic refining and distribution costs; the other 
to acquire downstream assets overseas that will ensure outlets for Gulf crude 
or products. The importance of the first process in spreading an aura of ef-
ficiency through the economy and reducing any cost-pull effect has already 
been mentioned. Attempts to reintegrate the oil industry from the Gulf 
source with the final consumer could have extremely far-reaching 
repercussions. 
In the short term, these trend~ would seem destined to result in lower 
netback oil prices to Gulf governments, because of the price war atmosphere 
in which the policies have been pursued. Ultimately, however, the possession 
of downstream oil investments by the Gulf states might be expected to lead 
them to take equal notice of the value added as well as rent element in the oil 
industry. To the extent that the former can be maximized worldwide and 
without many incremental effects locally, the result might be a more sus-
tainable and stable overall oil income. 
Privatization and capital market reforms 
There is talk, in Saudi Arabia at least, of privatizing the local oil industry 
once it has been restructured. If Gulf governments were to sell their oil 
assets for anything like their market price, another cause of the rental ailment 
might be removed and taxation restored on oil company profits . 
• If Gulf governments decided to privatize their oil and gas assets in 
parcels, they would no doubt encourage competition among the various na-
tional or joint-venture interests and force them to choose between investing 
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their surplus locally (where it might suffer from the effect of diminishing 
returns) or overseas (where, as private sector investment, it could be ex-
pected to face fewer of the obstacles that confront state investment). It would 
be surprising if private interests would allow a subsidy on internal gas and oil 
consumption to be tolerated for long. 
Privatization and the establishment of an internationally competitive 
return on capital would seem to be essential long-term goals of the Gulf 
economies, if they sincerely aspire to a Western system of economic 
management. In such a system, taxation of profits at differing levels might be 
expected to neutralize some of the apparent benefits of certain sectors, with-
out the cost to government of cross-subsidization and its own project 
expenditure. 
Until a deeper capital market is established within the Gulf, these pro--
cesses will necessarily continue slowly. The respective governments will, 
meanwhile, rely not so much on capital sales as on borrowing and taxation to 
bridge their payments gaps. Direct taxation is particularly unpopular in the 
Gulf, but some of the less well-endowed governments have taken advantage 
of a fall in inflation to introduce more realistic end-user charges, while 
import tax regimes in several of the Gulf states have been raised. 
These measures have to be weighted delicately against the dangers of 
making business costs in one member of the GCC uncompetitive vis-a-vis 
others. Local borrowing schemes have been fairly successful to date, largely 
due to the unwillingness of local banks to recycle liquidity pumped into the 
economy through government deficits back into the private sector. But they 
might clash with private sector credit demand to head off an incipient 
recovery, unless the general private sector savings ratio could be increased. 
Borrowing 
The Saudi decision to draw on the funds of agencies such as the Public 
Investment Fund and the General Organization for Social Insurance to cover 
immediate budget deficits has interesting implications, besides the fact that 
direct borrowing is almost as taboo as direct taxation in the Gulf. In drawing 
funds from the Public Investment Fund, it appears that a process may have 
been set in motion whereby the more successful industrial projects, such as 
those within the Saudi Basic Industries Corporation, may be asked to re-
finance their long-term loans on a commercial basis as a form of indirect 
taxation. 
In tapping state pension funds, the Saudi government may proceed 
either by indicating its intention to start funding future payment obligations 
out of current income rather than savings, or by suggesting that it expects pri-
vate citizens to adjust their own savings patterns over a longer time to make 
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up for government withdrawal from this responsibility. With the thinness of 
the Gulf capital markets, it would seem rather incongruous to have a govern-
ment trying to maintain an invested pension fund. There is, however, con-
siderable precedent, if not in oil-exporting economies, for governments ex-
changing investment assets for current revenue in such a way as to redress 
the national savings balances and restore the necessary conditions for future 
economic growth and, consequently, government revenue. 
Another option for Gulf governments is to boost local demand without 
spending any extra revenue. This can be done by a number of methods, such 
as encouraging the concept of a GCC-unified market, allowing expatriates to 
bring in their families and possibly settle, and further liberalizing the rules on 
foreign investment. All three of these measures would have the additional 
benefit of increasing the net foreign exchange position of respective states, 
and therefore helping to stave off the situation of either forced exchange 
controls or large increases in foreign borrowing, both of which would ulti-
mately reduce the flexibility of approach to a particularly difficult situation. 
Essentially it would appear that the pursuit of a mixed economy in the 
Gulf oil states is a flawed but inevitable policy. It is difficult to see the resolu-
tion of the present budgetary dilemmas in the near term. The situation is 
grim, but far from hopeless, and the countries appear to have a number of op-
tions not yet adopted that would provide industry with the necessary 
stimulus, without additional massive expenditure commitments. 
Future directions in industrial policy 
Along these lines and to counteract the difficulties currently facing the 
industrial sector, the following shifts in policy are feasible and likely to take 
place. 16 
1. The setting up of a comprehensive strategic outlook for industrial 
development at both the national and regional level. This will en-
compass fundamental decisions, such as import substitution or 
export-oriented strategies. 
2. Priority will be given increasingly to those products ensuring 
complementarity (through either backward or forward linkages) 
with existing capacity. 
3. The implementation of sliding-scale, protection-tariff formulas 
directly proportionate to the ratio of value added to total values . 
• 
4. More infant industry protection in the form of higher tariff rates and 
for a period of five years. 
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5. Government tenders drawn in such a way as to favour locally pro-
cessed products. 
6. Part of the governments' foreign aid provided in kind - domestic in-
dustrial products. 
7. Trading companies encouraged to assume part of the marketing re-
sponsibilities so far assumed by the industrial units. 
8. Adjustments to the educational curriculum, to provide more oppor-
tunities for technical training. 
9. Introduction of unified GCC policies, subsidies and tariff rates. 
10. The liquidation ofindustries which are not viable economically. 
11. The enhancement of consumer consciousness towards locally pro-
duced commodities. 
12. Streamlining the bureaucracy and administrative routines that nor-
mally delay the start of new ventures. 
A new development strategy 
The Gulf states are basically at comparable stages of development; they 
have similar resource and structural bases and share a common strategic 
outlook. They are all moving from public sector-led growth and over-
dependence on oil to private sector initiatives and a diversified production 
base. The general objectives of the evolving development strategy of the 
region will continue to include: 17 
1. Diversifying the region's economic structure, in order to minimize 
its exposure to external factors and allow a bigger share of the indus-
trial sector. 
2. The development and optimal utilization of the region's human 
resources by increasing human productivity and enhancing the re-
lation between reward and productivity . 
• 
3. Increasing the value added of local natural resources through 
downstream processing. 
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4. Meeting local market demand as much as possible, with an outlook 
towards increasing exports by capitalizing on the region's relative ad-
vantage in certain products. 
5. Creating an industrial and technological base that is self-sustaining 
and reasonably independent of the oil sector. 
6. Working towards the geographically balanced development of the 
region in order to enhance cooperation. 
The first stage of economic development in the region is almost 
completed; This stage lasted from the early 1970s until the early 1980s and 
made use of rising oil revenues to help build the basic infrastructures -
physical, human and financial. The second development phase has actually 
started. It involves a larger participation of the private sector and relies more 
on attracting foreign investors as joint-venture partners, including the trans-
fer of the appropriate technology, management skills and international 
distribution system. In other words, the existing infrastructure must be used 
to build new industries that have a clear commercial viability. 18 
Prospects for new industries 
There is still ample scope for the development of new industrial ven-
tures in the GCC region that enjoy a comparative advantage for the foresee-
able future. Tentatively the following areas can be identified: 19 
1. The industries that depend o'n the by-product of the refining 
industry. The local oil-refining capacity has increased considerably 
to meet local consumption and export requirements. The numerous 
by-products of the refining industry can be collected in appropriate 
quantities to support significant industries in the fields of petro-
chemicals in particular and the chemical industry in general. 
2. The downstream industries in the petroleum and petrochemical 
sectors. These include petrochemical intermediaries, plastics, solvent 
fertilizers, tyres, rubber products, paints, nylon and polyester fibres, 
detergents, animal feeds and other miscellaneous petrochemical-
related products. These industries can draw on relatively cheap basic 
products as well as cheap intermediate and finished products, includ-
ing those capable of being developed on an export basis. They also 
enjoy a major comparative advantage i'n the region, namely the abun-
dant and low-cost source of energy such as gas and hydrocarbon 
fuels. 
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3. The industries based on mineral resources which exist in economic 
quantities in Saudi Arabia, Oman and UAE. These include iron, 
potash, copper phosphate, gold, limestone, etc. These industries are 
characterized as being capital and energy-intensive. Developing 
such mineral-based primary industries normally creates external 
economies and forward linkages that would render investments in 
derived secondary product industries more profitable. Such indus-
tries would include the steel-related secondary industries. 
4. Industries in the consumer products field. The easiest way to seek 
opportunities here is to look at the leading brands in the market and 
then see if these can be produced locally. Once the established brands 
start being manufactured locally, they will immediately enjoy a 
secure market. The manufacture of these products locally would also 
create demand for a whole range of other related products and 
minerals. 
5. Industries in the synthetic and assembly fields. These depend on the 
proceeding industries or are characterized by the presence of large 
markets for their products in the Gulf area in particular and the Arab 
region in general. Examples include: the manufacture and assembly 
of certain types of automobile, industrial requirements that serve 
other sectors such as the oil industry, agriculture, light industries, 
the manufacture of household durable commodities, and metal 
products. 
6. The industries that serve the construction process of infrastructure 
in the GCC region in particular and the Arab world in general. The 
Arab region is still in need of large efforts to achieve the appropriate 
standards of local and regional infrastructure, such as the projects of 
desalination, transportation and communication. Among the infra-
structural projects are also included power, electric interconnection, 
education, and information communication and linkage. Numerous 
opportunities exist, as do the local capabilities for undertaking them. 
7. Industries that serve the national and regional defence and security 
sectors. The requirements in these two sectors are large and 
regenerating. Defence expenditure in the region has reached a point 
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where dozens of industrial projects are possible that are capable of 
serving this sector and hence minimize dependence on other 
countries for obtaining all the manufactured requirements. 
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8. Industries that serve the oil industry. This is by far the largest indus-
try in the region and its needs and requirements are numerous 
during the different stages of oil production (exploration, extraction, 
transportation and refining). Since the beginning, this industry has 
been contributing to the development of a large associated business 
sector and many industrial products would emerge to serve this 
industry. 
9. Engineering industries. The virtual absence of engineering industries 
is a major weakness of the region's industrialization strategies. The 
development of selective high technological and engineering indus-
tries would make it possible for countries in the region to attain a 
certain degree of technological independence and would help in the 
transfer and assimilation of technologies. 
Joint ventures 
The Gulf is still a tax-free region and has not yet experienced the 
bureaucratic bottlenecks that have hampered investment in other developing 
countries. It provides a tension-free industrial atmosphere, solid government 
support and ample financial backing which should attract many foreign inves-
tors to seek partnership with national industrialists. 
The environment in the Gulf for joint ventures today is different from 
the 1970s, when rates of return on assets of 35 per cent were common. Now 
it is more sophisticated. Development is related to countries' absorptive 
capacity and profits levels are therefore more normal. 
The changing economic situation is decreasing the importance of Gulf 
countries as markets for simple exports of goods and services. Instead, the 
significance of the role of the joint venture between the former supplier of 
such goods and services and the local partner will be on the rise. There has 
been significant growth in these patterns in recent years. Ultimately, this 
could turn out to be the only way in which foreign suppliers can maintain, or 
possibly even expand, their share of these important markets. 
The joint venture has become a major business development tool in the 
GCC region, where government policies have, in many cases, given broad en-
couragement for overseas partners to participate. While the package of incen-
tives differs from one country to another, the one provided by Saudi Arabia 
is the prototype and countries that are not already emulating it will most 
likely do so in the future. It includes the fqllowing: 20 
1. Fifty per cent of the invested capital is provided by the Saudi Indus-
trial Development Fund at very low rates. 
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2. Fully serviced sites are provided in the industrial cities for very low 
rentals. 
3. Raw materials are exempted from customs duties. 
4. Preferences are granted to locally manufactured products for govern-
ment contracts. 
5. Financial grants and free training facilities are provided to train 
Saudi staff. 
6. There are no restrictions on the repatriation of profits or foreign 
currency transactions. 
7. A ten-year fax holiday is given to industrial products, and there are 
no personal income taxes on expatriate staff. 
Future trade between the GCC countries and other Arab 
economies 
Theoretically, there are three principal approaches to economic 
cooperation within a regional framework: 21 
1. The classical approach, which involves 'across-the-board' trade libe-
ralization for all/most products through the formation of customs 
unions or free trade areas. 
2. The neo-classical approach which suggests a variation of the above, 
i.e. trade liberalization for certain existing industries or product 
groups in the context of a deliberate planned rationalization of 
production. 
3. Inter-country agreements for the establishment and promotion of in-
vestment in new regionally based industries that enjoy economies of 
scale, so as to meet more efficiently the collective demand of the par-
ticipating countries. 
In each case, the objective is to bring about successive economic inte-
gration through profitable specialization. The difference is that, in the case of 
(1) above, the procedural emphasis is on the operation of market forces by 
the negotiation of a suitable tariff structure, which is expected to work 
broadly in the desired directions. 
312 OPEC Review 
With the other two, the emphasis is on first determining the appropriate 
scope of cooperation in existing/new industries, perhaps on the basis of 
detailed feasibility and social cost-benefit studies, and then utilizing a variety 
of policy instruments, such as tariffs, fiscal incentives and administrative 
controls, to implement the desired objectives of cooperation through special-
ization in the patterns of production. 22 The economic development strategy 
of the GCC is likely to continue as a blend of (2) and (3) above. 
Soon after the GCC was established in 1981, its six member countries 
(Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the UAE) signed a sweep-
ing agreement designed to bring down trade barriers between them, standard-
ize regulations, coordinate industrial activity, encourage the free flow of 
labour and capital and harmonize fiscal and monetary policies. 
On paper, the Unified Economic Agreement (UEA) looks as ambitious 
as the Treaty of Rome, which has served as the model for the GCC. In 
practice, it is proving similarly troublesome to implement. 23 In thi~ context, 
the GCC member countries have agreed upon and, to varying degrees, 
implemented: 24 
1. A large number of common standards and regulations in areas rang-
ing from customs to ship registration and from banking inspections 
to enviromental protection. 
2. The elimination of customs duties on domestically produced goods 
and the imposition of a minimum four per cent tariff on imported 
foreign goods. In addition, goods passing in transit through GCC 
states are exempted from fees and taxes. 
3. Equal treatment for GCC citizens as investors, property owners, 
workers or professionals. Companies from one GCC state can under-
take most activities in another without restriction; professionals 
from other GCC states are subject to the same legal jurisdictions as 
nationals; citizens can own residential property up to 3,000 square 
metres in any member state and can obtain loans and set up retail 
trading businesses. 
4. Arrangements for preferential purchasing by governmental agencies 
of locally-produced goods. 
In addition, member states have been studying a variety of initiatives to 
integrate their infrastructures - which,"despite their rapid development in 
the last couple of decades, are hardly interconnected at all - and to harmo-
nize policies. 
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The most ambitious infrastructural project under consideration is a 
$2 bn plan to build a power grid linking national electricity systems as far 
apart as Kuwait and Oman. 
In the field of policy, the most interesting initiative is an agreement to 
coordinate GCC currencies, with the aim of working a unified exchange rate 
system in the Gulf. 
Both positive and negative factors affect the growth of free trade in the 
Gulf states. The positive factors include: 
1. Geographical proximity and reduced transport costs. 
2. High per capita income and high demand for imports. 
3. The absence of exchange controls in most states in the region. 
4. The absence of customs barriers or quotas in most states. 
5. A high tendency to import. 
The increase in the volume of trade in manufactured goods between the Gulf 
states in the past decade is directly related to the huge increase in the national 
revenues of these states as a result of the oil revenue increase. Higher per 
capita income levels created a radical change in consumption patterns, with 
an enormous growth in demand for consumer and capital goods. 
Even though the greater part of the new demand for commodities was 
met by imports from the advanced industrial countries, the Gulf states them-
selves gained a share of the market from re-exports and from trading the pro-
ducts of their own industries. Thus these industries were beginning to make 
an impact, despite the lack of coordination in industrial development in the 
region until recently. 
Despite the growth in trade in recent years, the negative factors imped-
ing the growth of such exchange will remain powerful, and include: 
1. The similarity of industrial output in each state and the lack of 
coordination. 
2. The development of identical industrial plants in neighbouring 
states (petrochemicals, fertilizers, steel), which has led to increased 
regional competition. 
3. With each state at a similar stage in its aevelopment and with similar 
industrialization strategies, the huge demand for capital goods which 
are not manufactured in the region. 
314 OPEC Review 
4. The Gulf market being wide open to the international market. 
5. The high domestic demand for some manufactured products, leaving 
no surplus for export. 
6. The absence of an export promotion system. 
7. The lack of information on export opportunities in neighbouring 
states. 
8. Minimal import duties on foreign goods from outside the region, 
leading importers to continue importing with higher profit margins 
instead of trading in regional goods. 
9. The dumping policy practised by some foreign companies. 
10. The high cost of production in the Gulf states. 
Of these factors, the first is probably the most important. If we take a 
look at the relationship between the market and the productive capacity for 
industries established in the Gulf states, we find a common pattern through-
out the region. 
1. There are export-oriented industries set up with production cap-
acities much bigger than local or even regional demand. Such indus-
tries include petrochemicals, fertilizers and aluminium. Production 
in these enterprises is linked to export distribution. 
2. There are a number of industries established primarily to meet 
domestic demand with production geared exactly to local demand, 
such as the food and beverage industries. In general, these industries 
do not produce a surplus for export. 
3. There is a category of industries with design capacities unable to 
match domestic demand. The state has to supply extra demand 
through imports, or the factories greatly exceed design capacity, 
thereby creating production beyond the economically optimal level. 
4. Finally, there is a category of industries to meet the needs of local 
• 
consumers while offering surplus output for export. Given limited 
local markets and the problems in finding additional markets, such 
industries usually experience considerable idle capacity. 
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Although the real solution to increased trade between the Gulf states 
will require long-term coordination in industrial development, there are a 
number of short-term measures which can be introduced to improve current 
levels of trade with tangible results. These include: 25 
1. The abolition of import duties for products originating in other Gulf 
states, removing all obstacles to the free flow of goods between 
states in the region. The six states of the GCC agreed to such meas-
ures under the terms of the GCC Unified Economic Agreement 
signed in 1981 and scheduled to be fully implemented in 1988. 
2. Action against unfair competition from foreign imports by the impo-
sition of protective tariffs to raise the price of imports to at least 
equal the price of locally manufactured goods, especially if the goods 
are of equal quality and standards. The GCC decision to impose 
minimum duties on foreign imports of four per cent and a maximum 
of 40 per cent from September 1983 was not adequate to meet the 
problem which exists. 
3. The preferential purchasing of national products by government 
departments, especially where the local products are of similar speci-
fications and quality to the imported alternative. Under this point 
comes the question of price differentials and of import licence 
quotas to force importers towards commodities manufactured within 
the region. 
The removal of customs barriers is not alone sufficient to promote in-
creased trade between the Gulf states. What is required is a drive towards a 
developed regional economy based on integrated production, with a coor-
dinated strategy in foreign trade relations to withstand competition from 
other regional trade groups. 
Inter-Arab trade is generally modest for a number of reasons, including: 
1. The lack of an integrated manufacturing base. 
2. The identical parallel development of industries in mutual com-
petition, instead of cooperation. 
3. The growing disparity in income between oil producers and non-oil 
producers. 
4. Bureaucratic problems, such as differential customs tariffs and quota 
systems. 
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Such problems cannot be solved quickly, and need a massive programme of 
industrial development in all parts of the Arab world within a planned pro-
gramme of cooperation, using the division of labour to create large markets 
for viable industries. 
Still, an agreement signed in 1981 for the promotion of trade between 
the Arab states provided a basis for solving many of the problems and, if fully 
applied, could provide a new opening for the Gulf states to export their indus-
trial products to other Arab countries: 
1. Linking free inter-Arab trade with Arab economic integration. 
2. Separating trade relations from political relations between Arab 
states, so that trade is not affected by political factors. 
3. The coordination of Arab economic and trade relationships to with-
stand the pressure from other geographic or economic groups, and 
agreeing to a level of protection for Arab products against foreign 
competition. 
In addition to the 1981 agreement, other avenues exist for increasing 
the flow of inter-Arab trade, such as bilateral agreements which allow a 
higher degree of flexibility according to specific circumstances that can be 
covered in more general international agreements including all Arab 
countries. There is no doubt wha~soever that the non-oil producing Arab 
countries could form an important logical market for the industries of the 
Gulf states in the future. 
The Gulf states enjoy strong relationships with many developing 
countries, especially in Africa and southern Asia. Though such relations 
have long historical origins, they have become more important since the 
Gulf states and many of the other developing countries gained political 
independence. Trade already exists between the Gulf states and the develop-
ing countries in the form of oil exports and food imports, and a logical basis 
exists for expansion into the manufacturing area. 
In addition to the external factors, which limit the potential market for 
Gulf exports at present, there are domestic restraints which are represented 
by the lack of any clear link between investment and production policy on 
the one hand and export strategy on the other, although all the Gulf states 
have an expressed desire to increase thei1- industrial exports. With the excep-
tion of the petrochemicals industry, there has been a lack of a sound assess-
ment of export potential. 
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In short, increased Gulf and inter-Arab trade and the identification of 
regional needs hold the key to further Gulf industrial cooperation, and to a 
greater rationalization of the region's manufacturing base. The awareness of 
neighbouring markets and productive capacities has created a practical logic 
for the kind of industrial cooperation and integration that was previously ap-
preciated only at theoretical and institutional levels. 
Conclusions 
This assessment of future industrial development in the Arab Gulf 
region has implicitly placed a great deal of emphasis on the role of the private 
sector in the process of future Gulf industrial development. At the same 
time, it is clear that the private sector alone will not be able to sustain high 
overall rates of growth in investment in manufacturing activity. In part, the 
private sector's confidence has been shaken by the post-1982 decline in 
government expenditure. More important, however, is the fact that the time 
horizon of this sector is relatively limited to the immediate future and to 
quick returns. 
There are numerous new and profitable investment opportunities in 
the region. But many of these require a long-term view and the taking into 
consideration of all economic externalities. Because of revenue shortfalls on 
the part of many existing firms and reluctance on the part of commercial 
banks, these projects will probably have to be undertaken by governments 
with the cooperation of the private sector or joint ventures between the pri-
vate and/or local governments and foreign investors. 
In this regard, it is clear that, in' spite of the short-term financial prob-
lems facing the Gulf states, a number of previously unused or underdevel-
oped revenue options are available to these governments, and if exercised, 
should enable the countries to stave off a serious decline in industrial output 
and investment. 
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For the medium term, as Abed notes: 26 
" ... available indications are that, during the coming decade the 
Arab oil-producing region may gradually approach a constellation 
of favourable conditions in the world energy market that will 
permit oil revenues to rise considerably, thus creating a second 
'window of opportunity' for improved access to resources for 
development. The ability of the Arab world to exploit this oppor-
tunity for broad national development goals will depend critically 
on its success or failure in resolving certain fundamental issues 




systems, a redefinition of relations with the rest of the world and 
issues related to Arab integration. If the Arabs fail, the second op-
portunity may be squandered even more wastefully than the first. 
If on the other hand they succeed, they will have a better than 
ever chance to set their economies on a course of genuine self-
sustaining economic and social development." 
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